Exponential growth bias is the pervasive tendency to linearize exponential functions when assessing them intuitively. We show that exponential growth bias can explain two stylized facts in household finance: the tendency to underestimate an interest rate given other loan terms, and the tendency to underestimate a future value given other investment terms. Bias matters empirically: More-biased households borrow more, save less, favor shorter maturities, and use and benefit more from financial advice, conditional on a rich set of household characteristics. There is little evidence that our measure of exponential growth bias merely proxies for broader financial sophistication.
R a present value, time horizon, and rate of return. 2 On the borrowing side, we present new evidence that consumers display payment/interest bias: a systematic tendency to underestimate a loan interest rate given a principal, monthly payment, and maturity. The biases vary asymmetrically with maturity: Future value bias increases with the time horizon, whereas payment/interest bias declines with maturity.
The striking thing about these perceptions of costs and benefits is not that consumers make mistakes, but that the mistakes are biased in particular ways. The "wisdom of crowds" fails here, and fails to a greater or lesser degree depending on the side of the balance sheet and maturity. What explains this particular pattern? And is the pattern indicative of biases that affect actual decisions?
We show that future value bias and payment/interest bias are potentially linked by a single cognitive micro-foundation: exponential growth bias, the tendency to linearize functions containing exponential terms when assessing them intuitively. A literature in cognitive psychology documents that individuals display exponential growth bias in a variety of contexts, and that the degree of exponential growth bias varies substantially in the cross-section. But economics has largely ignored the potential implications of exponential growth bias for household finance. 3 The intuition for how exponential growth bias drives future value bias is straightforward: Consumers underestimate how quickly a given yield compounds, so they underestimate the expected future value for any given future date. Future value bias becomes more pronounced as the periodic return rises and the compounding horizon lengthens. On the borrowing side, exponential growth bias is mathematically equivalent to failing to account for the declining principal balance on an installment loan. So consumers overestimate how long they actually get to borrow the principal, thereby underestimating the true cost of borrowing. Payment/interest bias is more severe on short-term loans because principal balances on those loans decline faster than on long-term loans. 4 We next examine the following critical question for household finance: Does exponential growth bias affect household balance sheets in the real world? We are not aware of any prior work on this question. To answer it we construct a 2 Future value bias is our term for the tendency documented most directly in Eisenstein and Hoch (2005) . 3 The cognitive psychology literature began with Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975) ; we provide a brief review in Internet Appendix A (please find all Internet Appendices at http://www. afajof.org/supplements.asp). Economic applications of exponential growth bias to date have been limited to perceptions about savings (Eisenstein and Hoch (2005) ) and inflation (Jones (1984) , Kemp (1984) , and Keren (1983) ). Exponential growth bias does not appear in any of the many reviews of psychological evidence for economists; see, for example, Rabin (1998) , Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman (2002) , and Kahneman (2003) . 4 We treat the link between exponential growth bias and borrowing cost perceptions formally in Internet Appendix B, but for intuition the limiting case in the other direction is instructive. The formula for the interest rate on an infinite maturity (interest-only) loan is i = p/L, the periodic payment divided by the principal; it does not involve any exponentiation and the principal balance never declines, so exponential growth bias (or failure to account for declining principal balances) is not an issue.
household-level measure of payment/interest bias, and correlate it with a wide range of household financial outcomes. The results suggest that bias matters: Payment/interest bias is strongly correlated with more borrowing, less saving, portfolios tilted toward short-term installment debt and short-term assets, and lower net worth. 5 All of these results are conditional on controls for demographic and life-cycle factors, available resources, preferences, expectations, and other decision inputs. 6 While our data lack a direct measure of future value bias, the pattern of results suggests that payment/interest bias captures future value bias as well; in particular, payment/interest bias is correlated with asset allocation conditional on the level of assets.
The above findings motivate four follow-on questions. First, why doesn't consumer adaptation (learning, calculators, heuristics, etc.) render bias irrelevant? We find that many consumers do in fact effectively debias themselves by relying on outside financial advice. More-biased households get more outside advice, all else equal, suggesting that many consumers are aware of their bias and/or its effects. Further, more-biased households who get outside advice are just as wealthy as the least-biased households. Yet our results also suggest that many biased households do not delegate, learn rapidly enough, or otherwise undo the effects of bias. Psychology again offers an explanation: Cognitive biases tend to persist and decision-making heuristics tend to fail when decisions are abstract and made infrequently (Stanovich (2003) ). Many borrowing, saving, and portfolio decisions in household finance seem to fit that description.
A second question is why supply-side factors or regulation fail to eliminate the effects of bias. We do find that credit constraints play a mitigating role, by preventing some biased households from borrowing as much as they would like. Existing Truth-in-Lending laws could make payment/interest bias irrelevant by forcing lenders to disclose an annual percentage rate (APR), but the APR disclosure mandated by Truth-in-Lending is imperfectly enforced. Many lenders use "monthly payment" marketing that shrouds or misrepresents interest rates, itself prima facie evidence that bias matters in the market given that violating Truth-in-Lending is costly. 7 Our related work examines this issue in further detail, and shows that consumers with greater payment/interest 5 Methodologically speaking, empirical work testing relationships between an individual-level measure of a potentially biased decision input and household/consumer financial choices is rare. Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) and Meier and Sprenger (2008) use survey questions to construct measures of time-inconsistent preferences and then examine relationships between preferences and saving or borrowing decisions. Puri and Robinson (2007) examine relationships between a measure of optimism based on life expectancy and financial decisions in the 1995 to 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2008) summarize and extend the corporate finance literature on links between managerial attitudes (e.g., preferences and beliefs) and firm behavior. 6 Our Internet Appendix C details the full set of controls. We use the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances because no more recent data set has data on biased interest rate perceptions. In Section VI, the Conclusion, we note that the expansion and increased sophistication of retail financial markets may make biased perceptions even more relevant today (despite the growth of low-cost decision aids).
7 See Gabaix and Laibson (2006) for a model of a shrouding equilibrium. R bias pay higher loan interest rates (Stango and Zinman (2009) ). 8 On the saving side, firms selling saving and investment products have incentives to debias consumers, but regulation may hinder them from highlighting returns over long horizons, where future value bias is most severe.
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A third question is whether our results ref lect the specific effects of exponential growth bias, or whether bias is a measure of low financial sophistication defined more broadly. 10 On the asset side of the balance sheet, we conduct additional tests by estimating conditional correlations between our bias and standard indicators of sophistication, focusing on outcomes that would not necessarily be driven by exponential growth bias in its narrow form. The most-biased households are less likely to hold bonds, but the correlation is economically small. There is also some evidence of a relationship between bias and poor diversification. On two other indicators-holdings of own-company stock and frequent stock trading-we find no correlations with bias. On the liability side of the balance sheet, a standard hypothesis is that sophistication reduces the participation cost of borrowing. Hence, under this hypothesis one might expect our more-biased households to hold less debt if unmeasured sophistication were driving our results. 11 We find little evidence of this pattern; short-term borrowing increases with bias, and long-term borrowing is uncorrelated. Overall, then, there seems to be a weak relationship between bias and lack of financial sophistication more broadly. Nevertheless, the results do not rule out a link between bias and financial sophistication, and we hope that they will provoke further inquiry. Perhaps, for example, being aware of one's bias is a component of financial literacy.
Fourth and finally, it is possible that our measure of bias is correlated with unobserved elements of preferences or expectations. Our controls do include measures of time preference, risk aversion, and income expectations, making it unlikely that they are omitted variables driving the results. However, we lack measures of "behavioral" biases such as time inconsistency, loss aversion, 8 More specifically, we find that biased consumers pay higher interest rates on short-term installment loans, but only when borrowing from lenders facing relatively weak Truth-in-Lending enforcement. Imperfectly enforced Truth-in-Lending may also have the perverse consequence of creating folk wisdom that using interest rates is the "right" way to make decisions and thereby nudging some biased consumers away from an effective decision rule: "Never try to infer an interest rate. Rather, make borrowing decisions based on other loan terms." 9 For example, SEC rule 230.482 requires mutual funds that advertise performance data to present 1-, 5-, and 10-year returns with equal prominence. A mutual fund that wishes to present returns earned over a longer horizon can do so, but only in addition to the 1-, 5-, and 10-year horizons, and with equal prominence. Our findings may also explain why mutual funds would highlight arithmetic rather than geometric mean fund returns. See Welch (2000) for a discussion of the difference.
10 Several papers have found positive correlations between broader measures of financial sophistication (or planning, or cognitive ability) and stock market participation or wealth, for example: Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) , Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) , Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006) , Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2006) , and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2007) .
11 Sophistication might instead push households to borrow less and save more; for instance, if sophisticates recognize subtle future risks (long-term care costs, reductions in social insurance) and others do not. or optimism. It may therefore be the case that individuals with exponential growth bias have biases in other dimensions as well, and that those other biases drive our observed relationships between payment/interest bias and financial decisions. This is a promising line of inquiry for future theoretical and empirical work. One intriguing possibility is that exponential growth bias is a tractable way to measure a portfolio of behavioral biases.
Taken together, the findings above offer a new class of psychological biases that might affect household finance. Previous work has incorporated psychology-based specifications of preferences, expectations, and problemsolving.
12 But most work in household finance continues to assume that consumers correctly perceive the decline (increase) in future consumption that results from borrowing (saving) today. Our findings suggest that exponential growth bias leads consumers to get these assessments wrong, and to err systematically in particular directions that tilt portfolios toward short-term debt and away from long-term saving, increase borrowing and reduce saving, and depress overall wealth accumulation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents evidence showing that consumers display both future value bias and payment/interest bias. Section II shows that exponential growth bias can explain both biases, and also discusses some other explanations for the observed pattern of biases. Section III describes our approach to estimating the link between payment/interest bias and household financial outcomes, and also reports summary data on our outcomes and control variables. Section IV presents our results. Section V discusses complementary/alternative interpretations of the results. Section VI concludes.
I. Payment/Interest Bias and Future Value Bias: Evidence
In this section we discuss previous work showing empirical evidence of payment/interest bias and future value bias, present new empirical evidence of the former, and summarize the stylized facts that one can draw from all of the work to date. Eisenstein and Hoch (2005) present lab data showing that most consumers display future value bias. Their study asks Internet survey participants to estimate a future value given a present value, time horizon, and interest rate. Eisenstein and Hoch show that future value bias is prevalent (over 90% of respondents err on the low side), large on average, and increasing in the time 12 For heuristic alternatives to dynamic optimization see, for example, Lettau and Uhlig (1999) , Hurst (2006) , and Benartzi and Thaler (2007) . There is also a related literature on financial planning; see for example, Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) and Lusardi (2003) . For alternative formulations of beliefs see, for example, Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Puri and Robinson (2007) . For alternative formulations of preferences see, for example, Angeletos et al. (2001) , Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) , and Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) . R horizon. 13 Respondents display a strong tendency to anchor on a linear forecast of the future value, and to ignore the returns provided by compounding.
A. Prior Work
On the borrowing side, several previous studies contain empirical evidence that consumers make mistakes when assessing interest rates.
14 Most studies establish this by asking respondents to estimate the interest rate implied by a given loan principal, maturity, and repayment stream. This work includes Juster and Shay (1964) , National Commission on Consumer Finance (1972), Day and Brandt (1974) , Parker and Shay (1974) , and Kinsey and McAlister (1981) . More recently, Bernheim (1995 Bernheim ( , 1998 and Moore (2003) find evidence consistent with limited understanding of loan terms, including interest rates.
The focus of prior work on the borrowing side is noteworthy; it primarily seeks to measure consumers' mistakes in assessing interest rates, rather than determine the extent to which mistakes are biased in particular directions. The empirical implications of (presumably mean-zero) mistakes are different from the implications of bias, a point we elaborate on below. However, despite the focus of previous work on measuring mistakes, it is often easy to infer from summary data provided in the papers that consumers display payment/interest bias. Some papers do make more direct statements about bias; for instance, Parker and Shay (1974, p. 217) note that consumers display "a strong tendency to underestimate annual percentage rates of charge by about one-half or more . . ."
B. New Evidence: Payment/Interest Bias on Hypothetical Loans
We build on the prior work above in several ways. We start by presenting nationally representative empirical evidence on payment/interest bias from two previously untapped sources: the 1983 and 1977 Surveys of Consumer Finances. 15 We use the 1983 SCF because it has the most recent (and, as far as we know, the only) nationally representative data on both payment/interest bias and household financial outcomes. We use the 1977 SCF because it contains richer data on payment/interest bias than the 1983 survey; the downside of the 1977 SCF is that it lacks comprehensive data on the household balance sheet. More recent SCFs lack any questions that elicit payment/interest bias and hence are not usable for our purposes. 13 Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) show that responses to a question on savings yields in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) are consistent with the underestimation of compound yields. We note, however, that the HRS question does not necessarily capture a bias per se: Its multiple choice format provides respondents with options that underestimate the yield implied by the question, but not with options that overestimate the yield.
14 Studying how consumers infer rates from other loan terms was motivated by lender marketing practices that emphasized monthly payments and obscured or omitted interest rates (see National Commission on Consumer Finance (1972)). Policymakers view accurate and unbiased perceptions of interest rates as critical because rates potentially provide a standard unit of comparison for loans with different maturities, and for loans to savings instruments with returns stated as interest rates.
15 Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.html.
We measure payment/interest bias using two hypothetical questions that appear in both the 1977 and 1983 SCFs. 16 The first question is:
Suppose you were buying a room of furniture for a list price of $1,000 and you were to repay the amount to the dealer in 12 monthly installments. How much do you think it would cost, in total, for the furniture after one year-including all finance and carrying charges?
The response to this first question is a lump sum repayment total (e.g., $1,200). Given the pre-defined maturity and principal amount, the repayment total yields i * , the implied APR 17 per the respondent's self-supplied repayment total.
18 Figure 1a shows the distribution of the implied APR in the 1983 SCF across all households. The mean is 57%, which corresponds to a stream of payments over the year totaling roughly $1,350. The modal implied APR is 35% ($1,200) , with other frequent rates corresponding to round repayment totals ($1,300, $1,400, $1,100, etc.). The 25 th percentile is 35% and the 75 th is 81% ($1,500).
The next question in the survey is:
"What percent rate of interest do those payments imply?"
This response is i p , the perceived APR. Figure 1b shows the distribution of perceived APRs. The perceived rate distribution has a lower variance than the actual rate distribution, but the perceived rate is still correlated with the actual rate; the correlation is 0.46 among those with implied APRs below the median.
Payment/interest bias is the difference between the perceived and implied APRs. Figure 2a presents a histogram of payment/interest bias in the 1983 SCF. Over 98% of respondents underestimate the actual rate. Roughly 20% of respondents give the "simple" or "add-on" rate (e.g., a repayment total of 16 The survey respondent is whomever was determined to be the "most knowledgeable about family finances." We use the terms "household," "individual," "consumer," and "borrower" interchangeably.
17 See equation (4) for a formal definition of the APR. Although the SCF question does not specify a particular definition of "rate of interest," we use the APR as our benchmark because: (1) it has been the standard unit of comparison for borrowing costs in the United States since the enactment of the Truth-in-Lending law in 1968; and (2) it is the rate respondents supply when asked about the most prevalent type of loan, home mortgages. Using alternative benchmarks such as the Effective Annual Rate, which is higher than the APR and may be a better measure of true borrowing costs, does not change the results because we use cross-sectional variation in perceptions; that is, we use relative and not absolute bias (see equation (8)). 18 We assume that the monthly installment payments are equal when calculating the implied APR. Different assumptions about payment arrangements do not change the qualitative results that respondents generally underestimate interest rates (even if we assume that the first 11 payments are zero, and the last completely repays the loan). More importantly, while such transformations change the level measure of misperception they do not alter the cross-sectional ranking in misperception. As noted directly above, it is this ranking that provides identification in our empirical tests below. . Implied and perceived rates on a hypothetical loan in the 1983 SCF. "Implied rate" is the APR calculated using the consumer's self-supplied repayment total on a hypothetical $1,000, 12-month installment loan. "Perceived rate" is the rate inferred by the consumer given the same terms. See Section I.C for additional details.
$1,200 yields a perceived rate of 20%). 19 But responses are biased even relative to this rate; those who supply something other than the add-on rate tend to underestimate relative to the add-on (Figure 2b ). The size of bias is quite striking, although not integral to our empirical work (which focuses on crosssectional differences in bias). The median bias is −25 percentage points (2,500 basis points), and the mean bias is −38 percentage points. 20 Table I shows tabular data on payment/interest bias in both the 1983 and 1977 SCFs. The data 20 The Juster and Shay (1964) results allow one to infer something about the size of payment/interest bias. Average bias in their sample of Consumers Union members is substantial (1,500 basis points) but smaller than in our samples. show that bias is similar in both surveys, although it is slightly smaller in the 1977 data. We stratify bias into the quintiles that we use to measure relative differences in bias for our analysis of whether bias affects decisions. While we do not know of any more recent representative data measuring payment/interest bias, there is one bit of corroborating contemporary evidence. Following an internal presentation of this paper, a skeptical colleague gave an updated version of the SCF questions to students in a finance class that had recently covered discounting. Of 37 students, all underestimated the APR: One gave a rate above the add-on rate, 12 gave the add-on rate, and the remainder underestimated relative to both the APR and the add-on rate.
C. New Evidence: Bias on Actual Loans
Both the 1983 and 1977 SCFs also contain self-reported interest rates on actual loans: on all installment loans in the 1977 SCF and on mortgages in the 1983 SCF. This is useful because with self-reported data on principal, maturity, and payments, we can calculate the implied APR on each loan, assuming that consumers report non-interest loan terms accurately. This allows us to ask whether consumers also display payment/interest bias on actual loans, and moreover whether payment/interest bias varies with loan maturity (recall that the hypothetical question concerns only a 1-year maturity). Table II presents summary data on payment/interest bias on all actual nonmortgage installment loans in the 1977 SCF and all actual mortgages in the 1983 SCF. 21 The data reveal substantial payment/interest bias on short-term loans; for the shortest-maturity loans actual rates average 30% while perceived rates average 13%. Payment interest bias on actual loans is positively correlated with payment/interest bias on hypothetical loans. This is evident from the bottom two panels of Table II. The other striking result is that bias falls with maturity, and is close to zero for the longest-maturity installment loans and mortgage loans (which R themselves tend to have 15-to 30-year maturities). Virtually everyone is unbiased on mortgage loans; 96% provide the correct APR.
D. Summary of the Evidence on Payment/Interest and Future Value Bias
There are three sets of stylized facts on how consumers intuitively perceive the costs and benefits of intertemporal tradeoffs. First, consumers systematically display future value bias in the lab. Second, they systematically display payment/interest bias on both hypothetical and actual loans. Third, the severity of each bias depends on the time horizon. Future value bias is more severe for long-term savings, while payment/interest bias is more severe on short-term loans.
When looking at these facts it is not surprising to see that consumers make mistakes, or even that they make large mistakes. The math of interest rates and future values is complex (as detailed in the next section). The striking thing is that consumers give answers that are biased: They almost always underestimate future values, and almost always underestimate loan interest rates. We now ask whether a common cognitive underpinning can explain not only payment/interest bias and future value bias, but also the relationship between each bias and the time horizon being considered.
II. Explaining Payment/Interest and Future Value Biases: Exponential Growth Bias and Other Possibilities
Here we consider several explanations for the pattern of payment/interest and future value bias documented above. In particular, we show that exponential growth bias ("EG bias") provides a parsimonious explanation. EG bias is the tendency of individuals to systematically and dramatically underestimate the growth or decline of exponential series when asked to make intuitive assessments (without calculators). 22 Thirty years of research in cognitive psychology establishes that EG bias appears robustly across elicitation methods and contexts (see Internet Appendix A for a review).
A. Exponential Growth Bias and Future Value Bias
It is intuitive that someone who underestimates exponential growth will display future value bias. Consider a consumer who saves a present value (PV) at a periodic interest rate i over time horizon t, with periodic compounding. The future value (FV) is
(1) 22 We focus on exponentiation rather than on the other mathematical operations involved in borrowing and savings calculations because there is little evidence of biases in basic arithmetic. For reviews of related evidence see Campbell and Xue (2001) and DeStefano and LeFevre (2004) 
t is an exponential function, and an individual with EG bias will underestimate (1 + i) t . Because the future value is just a multiple of that term, there is a straightforward link between EG bias and future value bias. Even a mild degree of EG bias can lead to substantial future value bias; consider a consumer with the following form of EG bias:
The θ term parameterizes bias: Unbiased consumers have θ = 0 and correctly perceive exponential growth, while those with 0 < θ < 1 have EG bias. 
The calculations use annual compounding and PVs that equalize the FV when θ = 0, to facilitate comparison of perceived FVs as EG bias changes. Figure 3 illustrates that EG bias is essentially irrelevant over a 1-year horizon, and has large effects over a retirement planning (30-year) horizon. We show the effects for a single interest rate to conserve space, but it is evident from (1) and (2) that the level effects of bias are increasing in the interest rate.
Another parameterization of EG bias is "linear bias," which is a useful benchmark because it describes a complete failure to account for compounding. The mathematical form for linear bias is f (i, t) = 1 + it, meaning that the perceived future value is linear in t. In lab experiments measuring EG bias, perceived future values are often closer to those implied by linear bias than to the true value.
B. Exponential Growth Bias and Payment/Interest Bias
Interest rate formulas also contain exponential functions. The formula relating a periodic interest rate i to a loan amount L, maturity t, and periodic payment m is
cause they fit our loan data better. The median θ implied by the hypothetical loan questions used in Figures 
Actual FV uses an unbiased assessment of exponential growth:
Perceived FV uses the parameterized function:
Higher θ indicates greater EG bias. This range of parameterized EG bias is actually small relative to that estimated by Eisenstein and Hoch (2005) This equality contains the same exponential term that appears in the future value formula:
25 There is no closed-form solution for the periodic rate; it is defined implicitly. If the period is 1 month, the annual percentage rate (APR) on the loan is equal to 12i.
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Although the math is considerably more difficult than for future values, one can also show that EG bias produces payment/interest bias.
27 Internet Appendix B presents a formal treatment of the issue, proving that EG bias produces payment/interest bias and showing conditions under which bias is greater for short-term loans.
Despite the subtlety of the math involved, the intuition for this result is straightforward. Payment/interest bias is a consequence of failing to account for declining principal balances on installment loans. The most common incorrect answer on the hypothetical questions in Section I.C is the add-on interest rate, which represents the true cost of borrowing only if the borrower retains the loan principal for the entire loan term. But installment loans require borrowers to start repaying principal immediately, so given a fixed dollar amount of interest, the true cost of borrowing always exceeds the add-on rate.
28 A consumer who does not think about declining principal balances or underestimates their impact on borrowing costs will have the payment/interest bias we document in Sections I.B and I.C.
The mathematical correspondence between EG bias and failing to account for declining principal balances is best illustrated by the linear bias case. Suppose that, instead of using the correct formula in (4) to infer the interest rate, a borrower with linear bias uses f (i, t) = 1 + it to solve for the interest rate:
In that case the closed-form solution for the periodic rate is exactly the simple interest rate on the loan:
Thus, having a form of EG bias that completely fails to account for compounding is mathematically equivalent to the intuitive effect of completely failing to account for declining principal balances. R EG bias can also produce the (perhaps less intuitive) result that payment/interest bias is more severe on short-term loans. This comes from the fact that principal balances decline less quickly as maturity increases. Consider the limiting case. As the maturity on the loan approaches infinity, the last term in equation (4) disappears and the formula becomes m = Li; the periodic payment equals the principal times the periodic rate. Because the exponential term disappears, even someone with severe EG bias will correctly infer the rate from a principal and payment. Put another way, on an infinite maturity (interest-only) loan, there is no declining principal balance to complicate inference about the interest rate.
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Numerical examples also illustrate these ideas, and show that even mild EG bias generates substantial payment/interest bias. Figure 4 compares the actual to perceived interest rates on 12-, 48-, and 360-month installment loans, where t = [12, 48, 360] and θ ∈ [0, 0.15]. All calculations use an actual APR of 35% (to fit the modal rate implied by the questions we use to measure bias) and the same functional form for EG bias as in Figure 3 , meaning that the perceived rate solves
Even relatively low levels of EG bias (i.e., of θ ) lead to substantially lower perceived interest rates and to payment/interest bias that is greater on the short-term loans. It is essentially irrelevant on the 30-year loan.
A final point to highlight is that EG bias can produce biased perceptions of borrowing cost and saving returns either directly or indirectly. The effect is direct if consumers actually try to (intuitively) solve the problems described above. The effect is indirect if EG bias leads consumers to adopt biased heuristics like linearizing yields or ignoring declining principal balances.
C. Other Explanations for Payment/Interest Bias and the Bias/Maturity Pattern
EG bias is an appealing explanation for the biases documented in Section I because it provides a simple and coherent explanation for the entire pattern 30 There is a limiting argument in the other direction as well, though it is looser. Suppose a consumer underestimates the exponential term in the denominator of equation (4). As maturity t falls the denominator approaches zero, increasing the value of the second term and requiring a lower perceived rate to make the equality hold (given a fixed loan principal and monthly payment). The statement is a bit imprecise because i itself appears in the exponential growth term, which motivates the more careful analysis in Internet Appendix B, but the general thrust of the argument turns out to be correct. 31 The functional form in our numerical examples has the advantage of simplicity, but can yield perceived rates that are zero or even negative if θ is large enough given the other parameters. We view that functional form as a useful approximation within the range of data that we observe, rather than a form that accurately models the effects of EG bias across a wide range of settings. Reassuringly, Internet Appendix B shows that EG bias generates payment/interest bias under very general conditions on the form of bias. We use an actual APR of 35% (to match the modal APR implied by the repayment total responses to the 1983 SCF hypothetical), and a loan principal of $1,000. Monthly payments are $100 on a 12-month loan, $38.85 on a 48-month loan, and $29.00 on a 360-month loan.
Implied and perceived rates solve the installment loan payment formula:
Actual APR uses an unbiased assessment of exponential growth:
Perceived APR uses the parameterized function from Figure 3 :
of biases. It also has broad experimental support in other settings. But it is possible that there are other reasons for either the existence of payment/interest bias or the bias/maturity relationship. We now discuss those other explanations, noting which can be dismissed and which cannot. One set of explanations is for the existence of payment/interest bias (or future value bias) overall. At first blush one might think that payment/interest bias simply ref lects math mistakes or uninformed guesses. It is certainly true that calculating an APR (or a future value) from other information is extremely difficult, and the fact that people make mistakes is unsurprising. What is surprising is that when people make mistakes, they err in a particular direction. R Most evidence suggests that even on difficult questions the "wisdom of crowds" centers the distribution of answers on the truth (Surowiecki (2005) ). Our findings suggest that something systematic moves the distribution of answers away from the truth.
Another version of this explanation is that something mechanical about the survey questions leads people to supply perceived rates below actual rates. But bias is evident on actual as well as hypothetical loans, and is robust to different frames. Moreover, a framing effect would imply that bias is spurious and should be uncorrelated with real-world outcomes; we test and reject that hypothesis below.
A more subtle mechanical inf luence might work through time-varying market rates. Say the SCF hypothetical elicits current market repayment totals (on average at least) and respondent perceptions of "normal" (rather than current) market rates. Then our measure will mechanically produce greater levels of "bias" during a period when there are high market rates, as was the case in 1983. But this will only induce an empirical relationship between bias and household finance if the propensity to mismatch current and normal rates is correlated with something else that drives decisions. If, on the other hand, the propensity to mismatch rates is uncorrelated with financial decisions, then we should see no relationship between what we call payment/interest bias and any outcome of interest.
In any case the perception data from 1977 belie this concern, because during that period rates were both stable and typical by historical standards. 32 Table II shows that hypothetical loan bias is not much different in 1977 from 1983. Moreover, bias is also prevalent on actual short-term loans in 1977.
A second set of alternative explanations concerns the bias/maturity relationship. In this case there are plausible, complementary explanations for one fact: that consumers correctly assess the interest rates on their long-term loans. One such explanation is that consumers learn and remember their mortgage rates because the stakes are high. Another explanation is that enforcement of the APR disclosure, mandated by the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA), is effective for mortgages. Indeed, our related work provides evidence consistent with this hypothesis; TILA has more bite for banks than nonbanks, and banks dominated the mortgage market during our sample period. So, both of these factors could explain why consumers have accurate (and precise) knowledge of interest rates on long-term loans. Neither explains payment/interest bias on short-term loans, however.
In sum, EG bias or one of its intuitive analogues provides a coherent explanation for the pattern of misperceptions documented in Section I. No alternative explanation that we know of explains the entire pattern. We consider the possibility that our measure of bias is correlated with other factors that drive financial decisions in Section V.
D. Could Bias Matter in the Market?
A final issue of interpretation is whether payment/interest bias or future value bias could matter in the market. As noted in the Introduction, there are several reasons to believe that bias might not be completely neutralized.
On the consumer side, the mitigating effects of learning, heuristics (including ignoring interest rates), and decision aids may be incomplete in a relatively abstract, low-feedback domain like household finance. On the supply side, incomplete Truth-in-Lending enforcement may allow many lenders to continue exploiting bias by shrouding interest rates, and SEC rules discourage the type of advertising that may be needed to debias consumers (namely, advertising featuring expected future value earned over long investment horizons).
In the next two sections we detail our tests of the hypothesis that bias is neutralized or otherwise irrelevant in the market. We also test whether supplyor demand-side forces such as delegation and credit constraints counteract the effects of bias.
III. Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance: Empirical Strategy
We outline our empirical strategy in this section, and then detail our tests and report the main results in Section IV.
A. Payment/Interest Bias and Household Finance in the Cross-section
Our empirical models estimate whether household-level differences in bias explain the cross-section of outcomes in household finance. We lack a householdlevel measure of future value bias, and therefore focus on our measure of payment/interest bias as the key explanatory variable. We use specifications of the form:
The dependent variable Outcome varies in each model; we discuss the outcome measures below. The vector Bias contains payment/interest bias quintile indicators and a separate category for nonresponse to the hypothetical loan questions. 33 The latter allows for the possibility that nonresponders are more biased than the least-biased (i.e., quintile 1) households. The variable Addon is a dummy equal to one if the perceived rate (used in the payment/interest bias measure) equals the add-on rate; including this as a covariate allows for the possibility that households providing the add-on rate interpret the 33 We have used other functional forms for bias (a biased/unbiased indicator, the logarithm of bias, and a quadratic in the level of bias). The results are robust to these other functional forms, as well as to orthogonalizing bias by regressing ln(bias) on the full set of controls, and then using the deviation of actual bias from its fitted value to reconstruct bias quintiles. See Internet Appendix Table IA .I for some results. R payment/interest bias questions and/or behave differently, conditional on the degree of bias. The vector X contains all of the controls detailed below.
Intuitively, we would expect that payment/interest bias should increase shortterm but not long-term borrowing, decrease savings rates, and decrease net worth. 34 If payment/interest bias is also a useful measure of future value bias (which would be true if both are driven by a common exponential growth bias), then Bias should be correlated with asset allocation as well as debt allocation, and exert stronger effects over the long term and for high-return assets. We therefore test whether bias decreases long-term (and high-yielding) but not short-term (and low-yielding) investing.
The null hypothesis in each case is that the coefficients on Bias are zero (either because our bias measure is uninformative, or because bias is neutralized due to consumer or supplier adaptation). The least-biased households (quintile 1) serve as the omitted category.
B. Data, Outcomes, and Control Variables
In the empirical work below we use data from the 1983 SCF rather than the 1977 SCF, because the 1983 survey covers the household balance sheet more comprehensively. The top panel of Table III shows our outcome measures, stratified by bias category. We discuss the outcomes in greater detail below, but to summarize they are: short-term debt/income, long-term debt/income, stock holdings as a share of total assets, CD holdings as a share of total assets, savings rates, and wealth accumulation. Not surprisingly, there are strong unconditional relationships between bias and all of the outcomes of interest. This highlights the need to control for other inf luences on household finance.
An advantage of the SCF is that the set of possible controls is extensive. Because minimizing omitted variable bias is critical, we take an approach that seeks to control for all factors that might be correlated with both outcomes and our measure of payment/interest bias, hence erring on the side of "over-controlling."
35 Our controls include measures of preferences, expectations, available resources (including income, defined-benefit retirement wealth, and credit constraints), claims on resources (including life-cycle factors), and problem-solving approaches (and financial sophistication more generally). We group them below for expositional purposes but emphasize that each of our empirical models includes all of the variables described below (and detailed completely in Internet Appendix C). Table III shows descriptive statistics on some key variables by bias category. Table IV (discussed in Section III.C) estimates multivariate correlations between bias and the control variables. 34 There may be income or other effects as well, particularly if payment/interest bias is generated by exponential growth bias; for example, EG bias may lead to lesser discounting of a given expected future income stream and thereby make consumers feel wealthier. In that case we view our empirical work as identifying the net effect of biased perceptions on our outcomes. 35 If there is a causal link between bias and any of these variables, we may underestimate the relationship between bias and our outcomes of interest (Angrist and Krueger (1999) ). Controls for available resources and claims on resources include: total household labor income (dummies for the percentile), homeownership, pension coverage, pension wealth and Social Security wealth (we exclude this wealth from our left-hand-side wealth measure since it was plausibly beyond the direct control of most households in 1983), number of members in the household, gender, education, race, age, marital status, health status, years with current employer, industry, and occupation (including business ownership or self-employment activity). We also observe two measures of credit constraints: whether a household has been denied credit or discouraged from applying in the "past few years," and whether the household has a credit card.
Controls for expectations about life-time wealth include measures of expected inheritance, expected tenure with current employer, and expected retirement age.
Controls for preferences include measures of risk preference, liquidity preference, and debt aversion; other work has shown that these are important determinants of household financial decisions. Risk preference is measured with the question: "Which of the following statements on this card comes closest to the amount of financial risk you are willing to take when you save or make investments?" Answers fall into four categories, ranging from "willing to take substantial financial risks to earn substantial returns" to "not willing to take any financial risks." Time preference or patience is measured with the question: "Which of the following statements on this card comes closest to how you feel about tying up your money in investments for long periods of time?" Answers range from "will tie up money in the long run to earn substantial returns" to "will not tie up money at all." Debt aversion (and perhaps an element of time preference) is measured with the question: "Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea for people to buy things on the installment plan?" We consider the implications of possible omitted "behavioral" biases in preferences and expectations in Section V.B.
Controls for problem-solving approaches and overall financial sophistication include whether the respondent evaluates loan offers by focusing on APRs or other terms (e.g., monthly payment, available loan amount, down payment, collateral requirement). Focusing on payments or other terms may ref lect a lack of financial sophistication, conditional on credit constraints. 36 Two other proxies for financial sophistication are ATM use (only 17% of our sample use ATMs at all), and of course education. We consider the possibility that elements of financial sophistication remain unmeasured, and the relationship between bias and financial sophistication more broadly, in Section V.A.
Controls for financial advice are categorical variables measuring whether households use external advice, and whether advice is from a professional, from friends and family, or from other sources.
C. Who Is Biased? Multivariate Relationships
Table IV sheds light on the conditional relationships between household characteristics and bias by presenting results from models with a measure of bias on the left-hand side and sets of controls on the right-hand side. We use two functional forms for bias: bias quintile and ln(−Bias); the latter coefficients are easier to interpret but discard observations with zero or positive bias. For each dependent variable, we present a parsimonious specification including a subset of important RHS variables, and a full specification with all of the controls listed above. One difference between these specifications and those we use below is that we use wage income quintile as a control here; below we use wage income percentile, which is much more f lexible.
Not surprisingly, income and education are highly correlated with bias. These relationships hold up even conditional on all of our other controls. Gender and race are correlated with bias as well. Our preference variables, somewhat surprisingly, are not correlated with bias once we control for income and education; we consider possible omitted features of preferences in Section VI.B.
A final point is that the fit is quite low. In the parsimonious specifications, 12% to 13% of the cross-sectional variation in bias is explained by other household characteristics. Even in the full models, household characteristics explain only 15% to 17% of the variation in bias. That is surprising given the sheer number of controls and the highly f lexible functional form for many of them (the total number of categorical variables is over 200). Bias is not easily explained by other household characteristics.
IV. Results
This section reports results of our primary empirical tests from the multivariate model (8). Each multivariate specification conditions on the full set of control variables listed in Section III.B; some contain additional controls noted below. The tables suppress most of the control variable coefficients (including those on wage income percentile) to save space. Table V presents results of our test of whether payment/interest bias encourages short-term borrowing (by making it appear relatively cheap) but not long-term borrowing (since even individuals with severe payment/interest bias should accurately assess long-term interest rates).
A. Liability Composition and Bias
Column 1 presents probit marginal effects from a model where the dependent variable equals one if the household used short-term installment debt to finance a recent large purchase (car, household item, or home improvement).
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This model also controls for characteristics of the recent purchase (month/year, product purchased, and product price). The coefficient on each of the bias quintiles is positive, and households in quintiles 4, 5, and the nonresponse category are significantly more likely than the least-biased households (in the omitted quintile 1) to have used short-term debt for the purchase. Each of the bias coefficients implies economically large increases (11% to 43% of the sample mean). Columns 2 and 3 test whether more-biased households have higher short-term debt-to-income ratios, conditional on having nonzero short-term debt.
38 Column 2 includes the entire sample of short-term borrowers, while column 3 drops households that face relatively severe credit constraints (measured by recent credit denial or lack of a credit card). Overall, the results show a clear positive relationship between short-term borrowing and bias: All of the 10 bias coefficients are positive. The results are stronger statistically when constrained households are dropped from the sample, presumably because rationing prevents some households from borrowing as much as they would like. The point estimates suggest that bias increases the short-term debt-to-income ratio from 37 This result is conditional on having made a large purchase; we find no significant relationship between bias and the probability of purchase. 38 We find no relationship between bias and having nonzero short-term debt. It may be that the extensive margin is not very elastic-short-term installment debt is used primarily for financing vehicles and consumer durables, and the near absence of second mortgage markets in 1983, along with small credit card credit lines, implies that savings was the main outside option for these types of purchase (responses to SCF question b5606, on the financing method for a large recent purchase, confirm this). 23% to 54%. Households with a perceived rate that equals the add-on rate also carry significantly more short-term debt, conditional on the bias quintile.
Columns 4 and 5 show that payment/interest bias is not significantly correlated with greater long-term debt (mostly mortgages and lines of credit). Here the long-term debt-to-income ratio is the outcome of interest. Note that our usual set of control variables includes homeownership status. The sign pattern on the bias coefficients is less pronounced, and none of the bias quintile or add-on coefficients is significant, although the estimates are imprecise.
In sum, the evidence is consistent with exponential growth bias affecting borrowing choices via its effect on payment/interest bias.
B. Asset Composition and Bias
Table VI examines the relationship between payment/interest bias and the composition of assets. If payment/interest bias is confined to the borrowing side, then asset choices should be unaffected by bias. If, on the other hand, payment/interest bias is a useful proxy for future value bias, then it should be negatively related to holdings of long-horizon, high-yielding assets. We proxy for long-term savings using the value of stock holdings (trading costs were high and mutual fund penetration was low in 1983), and for short-term savings using the value of CD holdings. 39 For each outcome we measure holdings as a share of total assets, and also as a share of financial assets (which exclude housing assets). These models condition on net worth decile in addition to our usual set of controls.
Columns 1 and 2 show that bias is negatively related to the proportion of assets held in stocks. All of the bias coefficients are negative, and 8 out of 10 are statistically significant. The coefficients imply that bias induces large decreases in stockholding (of 18% to 55% of the sample means). The controls also enter the empirical relationship in meaningful ways. Higher education (shown in the table) and income (not shown because it is specified as a vector of percentile dummies) are both positively correlated with stock ownership. Our measures of risk aversion and impatience are both negatively correlated with stock ownership.
Columns 3 and 4 report the same share specifications for CDs. The pattern of signs (all positive) and significance (6 out of 10) suggests that biased households substitute short-term for long-term assets.
In sum, the results are consistent with exponential growth bias affecting asset composition via future value bias. R   Table VI Stocks, CDs, and Payment/Interest Bias We define stock ownership as holding any public equities or non-money market mutual funds. Only 8% of the sample holds any mutual funds. Huber-White standard errors are shown in parentheses. All specifications include controls for the full set of covariates in addition to the those reported in the table: marital status, household size, employment status, health, homeownership, industry, occupation (including self-employment), pension coverage, Social Security + pension wealth decile, years in current job, any expected inheritance, expected retirement age, expected tenure at current job, use of advice on saving and investment decisions, ATM use, comparing loan terms on price vs. non-price margins, denied/discouraged/turned down for credit, and credit card holding. Table VII shows results for specifications correlating bias with savings rates and wealth accumulation. For savings we estimate an ordered probit, where the categories are ranked (1: dissaved, 2: even, 3: saved) based on a question about household spending versus income in the previous year. For wealth the dependent variable is the log of net worth. 40 As with the borrowing R   Table VII Saving, Net Worth, and Payment/Interest Bias Huber-White standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes in columns 1 and 2 are slightly lower than in comparable specifications in previous tables because the SCF did not impute values for nonresponse to the saving question. Columns 3 and 4 exclude observations for households with negative net worth. All specifications include controls for the full set of covariates in addition to the those reported in the table: marital status, household size, employment status, health, homeownership, industry, occupation (including self-employment), pension coverage, Social Security + pension wealth decile, years in current job, any expected inheritance, expected retirement age, expected tenure at current job, use of advice on saving and investment decisions, ATM use, and comparing loan terms on price vs. non-price margins. Columns 1 and 3 also include controls for denied/discouraged/turned down for credit, and for credit card holding. models, we also report estimates after dropping the most credit constrained households. Columns 1 and 2 suggest that bias decreases the likelihood of saving. All of the 10 coefficients are negative, and 6 of the 10 are statistically significant.
C. Saving, Wealth, and Bias
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In the less constrained sample the results are stronger statistically and larger economically. The coefficients imply a large reduction in saving relative to the least-biased households.
We see a similar pattern of results with ln(wealth) as the dependent variable (columns 3 and 4). All 10 bias coefficients are negative, and 8 of them are significant. The point estimates imply that more-biased households hold 7% to 33% less wealth than the least-biased households, conditional on our full set of controls. The controls matter in intuitive ways. Education and income are both very strongly positively correlated with wealth. Risk aversion and impatience are both very strongly negatively correlated with wealth.
In sum, the results on savings and net worth are consistent with exponential growth bias affecting decisions through payment/interest bias, future value bias, or both.
D. Bias and Delegation: The Role of External Advice
We examine the use and role of external financial advice in Table VIII . While the specifications in Tables IV to VII include the use of advice as a control, column 1 of Table VIII tests whether more-biased households are more likely to get outside advice. The dependent variable is equal to one if the household obtains any external advice for financial decisions. The results show a strong positive relationship between bias and getting advice, and households in bias quintiles 3-5 and the nonresponse category are significantly more likely to get advice. The point estimates imply 17% to 22% increases relative to the sample mean. This result suggests that at least some households are aware of their bias and seek help.
The next three columns estimate the relationship between using advice and the bias/wealth relationship. Column 2 shows the coefficients on advice when those variables are used as controls. There is a strong and positive relationship between advice and wealth, conditional on bias and everything else. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample by advice and test whether advice is related to the bias/wealth relationship. The results are striking. Among households that do not use advice the bias/wealth relationship is negative, large, and highly significant. In contrast, there is no significant relationship (or clear sign pattern) between bias and wealth for households that do use advice. This suggests that there is important heterogeneity in bias awareness or other mitigating strategies within bias quintiles. That is, for a given degree of bias and a rich set of household characteristics, some households effectively neutralize their bias (by delegating) while others do not.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that exponential growth bias matters in the market: Our measure of payment/interest bias is correlated with portfolio allocation, savings, and wealth in a way that is consistent with both a direct effect of payment/interest bias and a correlation between payment/interest bias and future value bias. The market matters too: The effects of bias are mitigated by credit constraints on the supply side and delegation on the demand side. 
V. Interpreting the Results: Alternative and Complementary Explanations
The pattern of results is consistent with exponential growth bias affecting financial decisions in specific ways. The rich set of controls helps to rule out many sources of omitted variable bias. Payment/interest bias may nonetheless be correlated with some omitted variable that explains (or at least contributes to) the results.
A. Bias and Financial Sophistication
One possibility is that payment/interest bias is correlated with financial sophistication more broadly. There is growing evidence that financial sophistication is key to understanding equilibrium household finance (Campbell (2006) ). In many analyses the empirical role of financial sophistication is studied indirectly, through proxies like education, income (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) ), and ATM use (Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002) ). As noted above, we include controls for such proxies in our analysis. But at least one study measures financial sophistication more directly and finds that it is correlated with a household financial decision even after conditioning on standard controls (van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2007) ). 41 Thus, in this section we consider how financial sophistication is defined, and how well payment/interest bias captures lack of sophistication.
Financial sophistication is often defined as an input that reduces participation, search, and/or per-unit costs (see, e.g., Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007), Campbell (2006) , Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2006) ). This is consistent with our stockholding results: More biased (and presumably less sophisticated) households hold fewer stocks. We also estimate whether more biased households are less likely to hold bonds, following Puri and Robinson's test for an omitted inf luence of financial sophistication. Table IX column 1 shows some evidence that bias does in fact depress bond market participation (quintile 5 is negative and significant), but the magnitudes are small: None of the confidence intervals on the bias coefficients implies a decrease of more than 5%. On the liability side of the balance sheet, the sophistication to lower cost channel implies that more biased households should use debt less intensively, all else equal (hence, other studies use total financial liabilities as a proxy for sophistication). But we find that more-biased households use more short-term debt, and no less long-term debt. So, if we have controlled adequately for "all else," the sophistication to lower cost channel does not drive our liability-side results, and overall we find only partial support for the hypothesis that our measure of bias captures sophistication that reduces the cost of financial products.
A related story is that financial sophistication improves decision making by helping households avoid bad deals or other mistakes. Table IX explores the relationship between payment/interest bias and three standard measures of investment mistakes. Column 2 finds no significant relationship between own-company stock share and bias in the sample of stockholders. Column 3 finds that stockholding households in bias quintile 5 hold a significantly fewer number of different stocks (with 90% confidence), suggesting that the mostbiased households may indeed be less diversified. Column 4 finds no evidence that stock trading increases with bias among households with a broker; this specification conditions on the number of different stocks owned. Each of these specifications controls for net worth and stock value deciles, in addition to our usual controls. In all, columns 2 to 4 provide little support for the hypothesis that our measure of payment/interest bias is strongly correlated with standard R investment mistakes. Because the standard errors are large, we emphasize that these results are merely suggestive. Overall, we find little evidence that payment/interest bias, or exponential growth bias more broadly, is strongly correlated with financial sophistication as the latter is typically understood. It seems plausible that financial sophistication and bias have important and distinct effects on financial decisions. It may also be useful to conceive of bias and awareness of bias as dimensions of sophistication. We discuss implications for modeling in the conclusion. 
B. Bias and Omitted Decision Inputs, Including Other "Behavioral" Biases
Another possibility is that our measure of bias is correlated with unobserved elements of preferences or expectations. Our control variables do include measures of some preference parameters, such as time preference and risk aversion, and these controls are significantly correlated with our outcome variables. We also control for measures of expected lifetime income. But our control variables may not capture other important features of preferences or expectations. For example, our data do not measure time inconsistency, loss aversion, or optimism. Thus, it may be the case that households with payment/interest bias have unmeasured "behavioral" biases in other dimensions as well, and these other biases drive our observed relationships between bias and financial decisions. We view this as a promising line of inquiry for future theoretical and empirical work. One intriguing possibility is that exponential growth bias is a tractable way to measure and model a portfolio of behavioral biases.
VI. Conclusion
We offer a new class of psychological biases in household finance that are driven by exponential growth bias. On the borrowing side, exponential growth bias generates payment/interest bias, which causes consumers to systematically underestimate interest rates on short-term (but not long-term) loans. On the saving side, exponential growth bias generates future value bias, which causes consumers to systematically underestimate the benefits of long-term saving. Exponential growth bias provides a parsimonious explanation for both payment/interest and future value bias that is based on a large body of supporting evidence from cognitive psychology.
More importantly, we find that bias matters empirically: An individual-level metric of payment/interest bias is strongly correlated with borrowing, savings, portfolio choices, net worth, and delegation. The effects of bias seem to be mitigated by credit constraints and neutralized by delegation. The latter result suggests that heterogeneity in bias awareness plays a critical role in driving financial outcomes.
Our evidence highlights several directions for future research. First, we hope that our results provoke further consideration of what is meant by "financial sophistication" and how it affects household finance. Our results suggest that exponential growth bias is specific in its effects, distinct from other household characteristics, and only weakly correlated with broader financial sophistication. But our work cannot completely disentangle the last relationship.
Second, we hope that future work will collect new, representative microdata on payment/interest bias, future value bias, and financial decisions. Much has changed since the last data set meeting those criteria was collected in 1983. Innovations in credit risk assessment have relaxed liquidity constraints, and lender marketing has grown more sophisticated. The upshot is that consumers plausibly have more opportunities to borrow at "low monthly payments" than ever (now on home equity loans, auto title loans, and payday loans, in addition to the auto and appliance loans that predominate in our 1983 data). On the asset side, consumers now make more savings and investment decisions for themselves, due to the decline of defined-benefit pensions and the growth of defined-contribution pensions, discount brokers, and mutual funds. Whether those forces swamp the advent of low-cost decision aids is an open and important question.
In addition to measuring exponential growth biases and broader financial sophistication, new data collection efforts should address other (behavioral) decision inputs as well. Measuring the correlation between EG-related biases and other behavioral biases (e.g., time inconsistency, loss aversion, over-confidence) would inform both empirical and theoretical models of household financial decisions. An intriguing possibility is that exponential growth bias could be a tractable modeling summary statistic for a portfolio of behavioral biases.
At a minimum our findings caution against modeling how consumers make intertemporal tradeoffs using a single interest rate, since consumers behave as if they perceive identical tradeoffs differently in the cross-section. There also seems to be important within-consumer variation in assessments across financial instruments and time horizons, and it may also be important to treat borrowing and saving tradeoff parameters separately from other elements of intertemporal tradeoffs, instead of lumping them together with discount rate parameters (Frederick (2005) , Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002) ).
We also hope that future theoretical work will explore how models incorporating exponential growth bias compare to those incorporating other behavioral biases. For example, in some ways exponential growth bias is isomorphic to hyperbolic discounting. Are they distinguishable theoretically? This is an important question, since the treatment prescriptions are totally different (commitment devices for present-biased preferences, debiasing for present-biased perceptions).
Along that line, another promising line of inquiry is how to debias consumers. Exponential growth bias is easier to identify than other behavioral biases. And treating EG bias may be more cost-effective than treating broader cognitive inputs like financial sophistication. On the supply side, stronger APR disclosure enforcement seems to weaken the tendency of more-biased borrowers to take loans with higher interest rates (Stango and Zinman (2009) ). On the demand side, there is some lab evidence that simple interventions can counter bias. Merely reminding consumers of opportunity costs can change decisions (Frederick et al. (2007) ). A computer decision aid can reduce exponential growth bias (Arnott (2006) ). A brief tutorial on the Rule of 72, which allows one to infer an average annual return by dividing 72 by the number of years in which an investment doubles, can dramatically reduce the underestimation of returns to long-term savings (Eisenstein and Hoch (2005) ). 42 These findings offer hope that debiasing treatments with underpinnings in basic research will improve financial decision making.
